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Abstract 
In many of the deregulated markets of the EU, incumbent firms compete with new entrants. 
Incumbent firms may have public servants on their payroll. We investigate the cost and 
benefit of public servant employment, and present a simple model that shows that payroll 
taxes for public servants are in equilibrium smaller than the ones for workers with private 
employee status. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Liberalization of regulated markets has been one of the most important economic reforms of 
the last two decades. In almost all OECD countries, network industries such as electricity, 
telecom, postal services, air and rail transport, and gas have been subject to profound changes 
in their institutional environment. National companies were often monopolies either owned by 
the state or, if private, heavily regulated by state institutions. This regulation did not only 
affect the way companies were operating on product markets, but also their employment and 
human resource policies. Many firms in regulated network industries employed excess labor; 
deregulation has consequently often been accompanied by massive labor-shedding (cf. Kikeri 
and Nellis, 2002). This is true for Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries alike. The 
privately owned U.S. Class 1 railroads, for instance, reduced their employment since 
deregulation started in the early 1980s from over 450,000 to less than 200,000 (Friebel, 
McCullough and Padilla, 2006). The German railroads, publicly owned Deutsche Bahn, 
entered the phase of deregulation in 1994, and have since then reduced staff from more than 
500,000 to less than 300,000.  
 
These similarities aside, there is a major difference between continental Europe and the U.S. 
In the state-owned European network companies, staff is employed under specific public 
employment rules and employees enjoy the status of civil servant (we will also use the 
equivalent term public servant). While the precise conditions of employment of civil servants 
differ across countries, there are some general features: (i) salaries are stable and tend to be 
above market level at least for women and young workers, (ii) special health and pension 
schemes, and most importantly, (iii) job security. Many of the former national monopolies 
have discontinued their hiring of civil servants, but they cannot lay off the existing stock of 
civil servants. Hence, an important difference between the incumbent public (or formerly 
public) firms and their private competitors lies in the specific legal status of at least part of 
their staff. Those workers do enjoy specific benefits, and the provision of these benefits also 
has implications on the involvement of incumbent firms in the respective national social 
security system, comprising health, unemployment and pensions. 
 
Competition between different types of firms should take place on a level playing field. 
Rather than looking at immediate distortions on the product market, we look at employment 
as a potential source for distortions on the product market. In liberalized product markets the 
incumbent firm competes with new entrants. Yet, while the incumbent firm may employ both 
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public servants and more recently hired employees, new entrants cannot hire anybody with 
the status of a civil servant. Incumbent firms thus have, on the one hand, certain obligations 
because they inherit staff with specific status from the past. On the other hand, they also have 
a potential advantage, because for their public servants they maintain their own system of 
benefits rather than contributing to the general social security system.  
 
We collect the available facts about employment in public firms and suggest a framework to 
compare the involved costs and benefits. We also present a simple model that builds on 
Blanchard and Tirole (2006) and shows that payroll taxes for public servants are lower than 
for private status employees. 
 
An important preliminary step concerns the source of finance to cover the costs of 
employment practices in the public sector. There may be situations where state funds cover 
these above-market price employment costs. Subsidies may come in different forms: as 
explicit wage subsidies, but also through pensions.3 The fundamental question would then be 
whether or not the subsidies constitute state aid according to Article 87/1 of the Treaty of 
Rome. In particular, such subsidies constitute state aid if there is an advantage for the 
recipient, a distortion of competition and an effect on intra-European trade. In general, it is 
assumed that the last two of these conditions are satisfied when the measure is selective, that 
is, not granted to all firms in the sector (see Friederiszick et al, 2007). This is true by 
definition as private competitors cannot employ labor as public servants.  
 
In this article we do not look at the issue of state aid; we take a different angle: does the 
employment of public servants provide an advantage for a public firm in a competitive 
market? In what follows we hence assume that the incumbent firm covers the wage costs on 
its own. 
 
Section 2 presents a short overview of employment and personnel policies in public firms that 
compete with private firms in network markets. We consider postal services and railroads. 
Section 3 extends the comparison between private and public sectors by taking a broader 
perspective. We survey the literature about differences in unionization, employment, 
composition of employment, wages, pensions, work ethics and incentives. 
 
                                                 
3 A rational worker takes pensions into account when choosing a firm, as pensions are deferred compensation. In 
the public sector this may be particularly important as pensions of public servants are both relatively high and 
safe. 
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Given these facts about public and private employers in the same market, Section 4 returns to 
the main question: how to evaluate the competitive advantage or disadvantage that civil 
servant workers bring to public firms. We focus on two elements of public servant 
employment. First, public firms inherit the job-security promise made to civil servants; 
private firms could promise similar job security, but their commitment remains imperfect. 
Hence, one could argue that public firms have an advantage. However, we make a revealed 
preference argument that this does not seem to be the case: public firms seem to have given 
up on hiring workers with public servant status during the last 10 or 15 years. Second, firms 
that do employ public servants usually do not contribute into the national unemployment 
benefits system but self-insure the employees through the job guarantee they provide or one 
that is given by the state in general. While the presence of public servants is a constraint to the 
strategy of a network operator, it is possible that it can benefit from maintaining such a self-
standing system rather than having to contribute to a nationwide one. We discuss this issue in 
a structured way that is based on the economic rationale for society-wide unemployment 
insurance and on the insights from incentive theory, by extending a model proposed by 
Blanchard and Tirole (2006). The conclusion summarizes the arguments. 
 
 
2. Public employment on competitive sectors: some case evidence 
 
Precise information about employment of public servants in competitive sectors is hard to get. 
The aggregate numbers of public service employment in Europe provides an approximation 
for some general tendencies. Rothenbacher (2004) shows that in Belgium, France, Germany 
and Sweden, public service employment reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, and has 
declined since then. The only, albeit notable, exception is France where public sector 
employment has increased over the full period of observation. In 2000 it reached more than 
20% of total employment, which is lower than in Sweden and Belgium, but higher than in 
Germany. In general, there is a tendency of most governments to reduce public employment 
because of budgetary pressure.  
 
These aggregate figures, while instructive as an indicator for general tendencies, are however 
only partially relevant. Much of the public employment is in non-competitive sectors such as 
law and law enforcement, the army or public administration. We are however interested in 
knowing about the effect that the employment of people in the particular status of public 
servant may have on competition with private firms.  
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There are no comprehensive statistics on these deregulated competitive sectors, hence, case 
studies are the privileged source of information. We here consider postal services and rail, 
because they are arguably the largest sectors, both sectors have been subject to substantial 
deregulation and restructuring, and they are coming under competitive pressure. We have 
tried to gather information on the magnitude of employment reductions and the percentage of 
civil (public) servants.  
 
2.1 Postal services 
 
Atzmüller and Hermann (2004) provide some information on Austria, Germany and Sweden. 
In Austria, since 1996, the company has decreased employment from 35,000 to 30,000; a 
further reduction of 4000 posts was planned for the time between 2003 and 2006 (available 
data cover the time until 2002). The Austrian Post has stopped hiring staff as civil servants, all 
new hires are now workers or employees with a private status. Hence, the share of civil 
servants has fallen from 75% in 1996 to 60% in 2002. The French post office has reduced its 
employment of civil servants from 85% in 1997 to 72% in 2002 of total employment.4 Since 
1990, its annual hiring changed its structure: in 1990, it hired 8000 public servants and 2000 
employees. Since then, the relative importance of employees has increased: in 2000, La Poste 
hired most of its staff as employees with a private status, and since 2003, hiring of public 
servants has effectively come to a halt (Figures provided by La Poste). Consequently, the 
share of public servants has fallen.  
 
In Germany, employment in Postal services fell by 42% (150,000 employees) since 1990. In 
2002, the German post employed 220,000 staff. The share of civil servants fell from 40% in 
1997 to 33% in 2002. For Sweden, estimates of employment reduction are between 22 and 
30% since the 1990s. In terms of public servants, Sweden is an outlier; in the Swedish Post 
the share of civil servants increased between 1995 and 2000. However, employment status is 
specific, because firing is usually quite difficult (mainly for economic reasons, i.e., survival of 
the firm). 
 
Finally, we do have some empirical evidence on wage differentials in the postal sector 
according to gender and race but this reference stems from the time before the great wave of 
liberalization (Asher and Popkin, 1984). 
                                                 
4 Full-time equivalent, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r02-344/r02-34465.html 
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2.2 Railroads 
 
Railroads have gone though similarly drastic changes. The Austrian railways reduced their 
average employment per year in the period 1980-91 from more than 70,000 to an average 
yearly employment of 55,000 in the period 1992-2003. The numbers of France in the same 
periods are 230,000 and 180,000, Germany 520,000 to 260,000 and Sweden from 35,000 to 
21,000 (all these numbers from Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes, 2007). The only country with 
detailed information about the split between public servants and employees is Germany. Here, 
the percentage of public servants has fallen from almost 50% in 1990 to 32% in 2001. 
 
The case of the German rail network firm DB provides some additional lessons. In particular, 
during the restructuring process, it was the interests of civil servants that had to be most 
respected. The German Constitution had to be changed in order to maintain the specific 
employment status of civil servants that were transferred to a special institution that sells the 
services of the civil servants to the DB, which is a joint stock company. Further the company 
created a number of internal labor market services to facilitate the intra-firm mobility into 
new functions, and it offers to those willing, outplacement services. Through these 
instruments and others like early retirement the consequences of labor restructuring have been 
mitigated. Naturally, all these instruments are quite costly, but a precise estimate is not 
available. 
 
Trade unions in Germany have been rather willing to compromise with the management in the 
restructuring process. The German trade union VerDi, the main trade union for public 
services, first tried to resist the liberalization and restructuring, but then engaged in a 
moderate position, trying to make the transition less painful. The German railroads have a 
sector/firm specific trade union, TransNet, which seems to have been quite supportive for 
management strategies, but has recently grinned its teeth, when it was considered to split 
infrastructure from operations. Furthermore, the locomotive driver union has taken a more 
aggressive position in negotiations and strikes are expected. 
 
Summarizing the scattered case evidence, it seems that restructuring goes along with a 
massive reduction of jobs, and a relative decline of public servants positions. The general 
belief is that public servants net of their costs of employment are more expensive then hiring 
employees with private status. Budgetary and competitive pressure seems to be the trigger for 
 7
this restructuring strategy. We have not found evidence that the hiring of public servants 
could be used in order to distort competition. 
 
 
3. Employment and wages in the public sector – stylized facts 
 
We know quite well about employment and wages in the public sector as a whole, but we 
know little about the potential differences between public administrations and public firms in 
competitive markets. However, it seems a reasonable assumption that wages for public sectors 
are similar because pay scales are usually nationwide for public servants. 
  
We are, first, interested in the impact of the civil servant status on the structure of 
employment and wages. Job security is only one of the many characteristics that define a 
public servant. There are many others; potentially there is social status of being a public 
servant, and there may be intrinsic value in working for a firm that provides public goods and 
services. Disentangling all these effects is impossible; the literature hence rather remains at 
the descriptive stage of assessing what are the broad differences between public and private 
labor. 
 
A second point refers to the list of labor market outcomes on which the public nature of the 
firm may have an impact. The literature puts forth employment level and wages but there are 
many other interesting outcomes (Gregory and Borland, 1999, for instance). An incomplete 
list of items contains the following: 
 
• The composition of labor force by skill, gender, race and other individual characteristics. 
This composition can be analyzed at the recruitment stage (as a flow), or at the current 
stage (as a stock) which is also a result of the structure of exits. 
• The wage setting and bargaining institutions like trade unions, and their relative strength. 
• The structure of pension rights. 
• Retraining and skill buiding on-the-job and the issue of specific and general human capital 
investments. 
• Mobility within the public sector or firm. 
• Work ethics and universal service. 
• Work incentives. 
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The differences between private and public firms regarding the influence of trade unions 
needs some additional comments. The relative strength or weakness of trade unions is likely 
to have an impact on employment and wages. It is almost universally found that union density 
is larger in the public sector (Gregory and Borland, 1999, Disney and Gosling, 1998). The 
rationale for this is less clear. First, workers can have different tastes for union membership 
and this could be correlated with tastes for the public sector. Second, jobs in the public and 
private sector can be of different types; this could make union membership more likely in the 
public sector. The fact that public establishments are larger than their private counterparts 
might also be an explanation, given that union density is usually related to size. Third, the 
structure of ownership might make the interests of the owners, be it politicians or the 
electorate, more aligned with the interests of the workers in the public sector. Fourth, it can be 
owing to the different labor status: no layoffs and no bankruptcy in most of the public sector. 
We do not know of any detailed study trying to disentangle these different arguments. 
 
We now review the empirical literature on employment and wages and some other points of 
the tentative list above. 
 
3.1 Employment and skill composition 
 
The literature indicates that there employment in the public sector is higher than what it would 
be under private management. Evidence from privatised firms supports this (see Megginson et 
1994, and the previous section on postal services and railroads). Two arguments have been 
advanced to explain this stylized fact. First, the labor demand can shift upwards because 
public owners, politicians and voters, tend to favour more employment. Second, trade unions, 
relying on their strength in the public sector, could affect bargaining and claim higher wages 
and for larger employment (the so-called “efficient-bargaining” hypothesis ). Recent evidence 
suggests that it is the first argument that seems the most relevant (Gregory and Borland, 
1999). 
 
A major difference between the private and the public sector relates to dismissal rules, 
dismissal costs and the probability of bankruptcy. There is overwhelming empirical evidence 
that the presence of dismissal costs affects the flows in and out in employment in the private 
sector. Even if dismissal costs are larger, the rate at which firms are shut down, called the 
destruction margin, is also higher. The costs of layoffs increasing, firms are more fragile or 
want to avoid paying these costs (Kugler and Pica, 2005).  
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Yet, there is a large variety of dismissal rules in the public sector across countries. Dismissal 
rules can be no different from what they are in the private sector as in most of the US public 
sector (Gregory and Borland, 1999), but also for a significant part of the public sector in 
Germany (Dustman and Van Soest, 1998). In other countries like France, most workers had 
until recently complete job security (except in case of wrongful behaviour). Yet, even if rules 
are different, public sector employment seems less cyclical than private employment in all 
countries. Because of selection effects, the composition of the labor force in terms of 
attachment of workers to the labor market is more controversial. Private firms in a very 
cyclical industry might recruit the less stable workers and layoff more. Some evidence is 
reported in the survey by Margolis and Fougère (1999) for the US.  
 
A second major difference between the private and public sectors from the 1970s onwards is 
the composition of employment. It is consistently found that the shares of females and 
minorities are more important in the flow of workers becoming public servants (Gregory and 
Borland, 1999). One possible explanation is that recruitment depends on relative wages 
between the public and private sector and depends on the rate of unemployment at the 
moment of the recruitment as shown by Fougère and Pouget (2003). Unemployment affects 
females and minorities disproportionately and we will see below that wage differentials are in 
favour of women and minorities in the public sector. Specifically, public recruitment seems 
countercyclical for women (Fougère and Pouget, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, human resource policies such as wages and promotions in the public sector have 
implications on the skill structure of the work force at the public utility. Exits seem to be less 
frequent for lower-skill groups and more generally for workers whose unemployment 
probability is higher. The stock of public sector employees would therefore be predominantly 
composed by those who exit less. This is the effect of a dynamic selection bias, a well-known 
composition bias in all event-duration analyses (Heckman, 1991). It also explains why the 
public sector tends to be composed more than proportionately by older workers in periods 
such as the last 15 years where recruitment is decreasing. 
 
3.2. Wages & Discrimination 
 
There are various econometric difficulties to measure accurately the effect on wages of 
working in the public sector. This is actually a reflection of the more general econometric 
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problem of evaluating treatment effects (Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999). The treatment 
variable here is the presence in the public sector and the outcome is wages. One would like 
ideally to measure the difference in wages that every individual can receive in the public and 
private sectors. As the joint observation of wages in the two sectors is not possible, one needs 
to impose assumptions to derive estimates of the average effects of working in the public 
sector for those working in the public sector or the potential differences in the whole 
population.5 A first step is to try to find all possible confounding factors, that is, variables that 
explain both the presence in the public sector and the outcomes, wages. Education age, gender 
and job characteristics such as occupations are high on the candidate list. One can then 
proceed by using matching methods. Unfortunately, one needs to write the comprehensive list 
of possible confounders in order to justify these methods.  
 
If some individual unobserved heterogeneity affects at the same time the probability of 
working in the public sector and the difference between wages, this causes hidden bias. The 
most well-known situation is the Roy model where the presence in a sector is determined by 
the differences of wages between sectors (Heckman, 1991). All unobserved terms affecting 
wages are necessarily also affecting the choice between sectors. Selection correction methods 
are needed but they rely first and foremost on the existence of a variable which explains 
participation in the public sector and not the differences in wages. Such a variable is 
notoriously difficult to find but this is not the only remaining problem. Under general 
assumptions, the precision of the estimates is slightly degraded since the estimator converges 
at an asymptotic rate which is lower than the standard rate (Heckman, 1991). 
 
Admitting these difficulties, empirical evidence is nevertheless quite consistent across 
countries. We now review results that hold observed characteristics such as education and age 
constant.  
 
In the UK and France, average wages for male workers in the public sector are larger than in 
the private sector but this does not seem to be the case in the US (Borjas, 2002, and Rodgers, 
2002) or in Germany (Dustman and van Soest, 1998). The magnitude of the differentials are 
of the order between 2% (France) and 5% (UK). In particular, the correction for the selection 
problems that we have discussed lowers the estimate of the differentials (Gregory and 
                                                 
5Even if sequential observations of public and private wages are possible if the individual enters or quits the 
public sector, it does not solve the problem since these individuals are a highly selected population, the selection 
being partly caused at least by the wage differences between sectors. Estimation and a critical argument of this 
procedure are developed in Disney and Gosling (1998). 
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Borland, 1999). Fougere and Pouget (2003) offer results in the French case, Disney and 
Gosling (1998) in the UK and Dustman and Van Soest (1998) for Germany. they survey and 
confirm these overall results in the international literature including evidence from 
industrializing European countries (Tansel, 1999).  
 
What is most striking is that wage differentials for females are much more significant and of a 
magnitude that can attain 10 to 15%. This is also true for minorities and young workers who 
seem to be less discriminated against. The argument advanced is that equal pay legislation 
between genders and protecting the minorities might be more powerfully enforced in the 
public than in the private sector. A second argument is given by political economy. As most 
public sector workers have low skills, it is more politically rewarding to increase their wages 
than the high skilled wages (Miller, 1996) and show that the State is a “good” employer 
(Lucifora and Meurs, 2004). 
 
The second key result is that, in all countries, the wage distribution is more compressed in the 
public sector than in the private sector. Disney and Gosling (1998) and Capellari (2002) offer 
evidence on the UK and Italy in addition to the evidence presented on France and Germany 
(see also Lucifora and Meurs, 2004). Lower-skilled workers receive a relative higher wage 
than higher skilled workers. The careful quantile estimation (albeit with no correction 
selection) of Disney and Gosling (1998) seem to show that it is the low intermediate skills 
who gain most because the very low-skilled workers are not likely to be employed by the 
public sector. In all these papers, the wage differential between public and private decreases 
the higher the position in the distribution of earnings and education. Furthermore, it also 
applies within a career path. Earnings are more stable in the public than in the private sector 
and the permanent component of income is more pronounced in the public sector (Capellari, 
2002). 
 
Besides political economy arguments that were already mentioned, there are two economic 
arguments explaining why wages could be different in two sectors offering different job 
security packages (Hübler and Hübler, 2006). On the one hand, there could be compensating 
differentials. Lower wages would be accepted against more job security. On the other hand, 
job security would improve the bargaining position of trade unions and thus job security and 
wages would be complements. There is no strong empirical evidence in favour of one or the 
other interpretation. Furthermore, differentials for men are almost inexistent which cast some 
doubt on both arguments. 
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Total compensation does not only include wages. Until now, we were discussing net wages 
that accrue to the workers. Limited evidence suggests that non-earnings compensation, in 
terms of health insurance or pension rights, is higher in the public sector because of differing 
payroll taxes, specifically because of pension contributions that we review below. 
 
3.3 Pensions 
 
Pensions can be considered as deferred earnings: rather than paying a worker a high wage 
today, a firm may offer high pensions. The inter-temporal structure of wages and pensions 
hence matters considerably for the attractiveness of public and private firms. In most cases, 
civil servants do not pay the same social security contributions that they would in the private 
sector, and their post-retirement replacement rate of earnings is larger. This may be owing to 
the way the life-cycle incentives are structured in the two sectors (Lazear, 1995). Dustman 
and van Soest (1998) show that in Germany where both civil servants and private-status 
workers are employed in the public sector, the net earnings over the life cycle are 13% higher 
for civil servants. This is mainly owing to higher pensions. Although the pension system in 
the UK is different (pensions are the sum of two different schemes: the basic pension rights 
and the additional occupation-related pensions), the same result obtains; deferred payments 
seem to be larger for public servants. This is also true in France where typically the 
replacement rate of earnings (including bonuses) is around 65% in the public sector and more 
around 55% in the private sector (Rothenbacher, 2004). There are also slight differences in 
the pensionable age but they tend to disappear over time.  
 
3.4 Continuous training and mobility 
 
We were not able to find any empirical evidence on differences between the public and the 
private sector. Empirical evidence on continuous training in some European economies 
(Fougère, Goux et Maurin, 2001, for France; Pischke, 2002, for Germany; Brunello, 2006 for 
Europe at large) points out that continuous training is mostly performed in larger firms and 
benefit mostly the already skilled employees and younger workers. Given that the trade-
unions are stronger in the public sector and given their emphasis on continuous training (as 
reviewed with some controversy by Brunello, 2006), it would not seem likely that continuous 
training would be less common among public servants than among private workers. Some 
however argue that given job security, the incentives to undertake training might be less 
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effective (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2005). It does not mean either that training is as 
effective in the public sector as in the private sector. What we know from training programs is 
that it is most successful among intermediate and higher-skilled trainees and this explains 
why private training is more effective than publicly offered training schemes (Heckman, 
1998). 
 
The evidence on mobility is even scarcer. Pauron (2003) explores the mobility of workers 
within the French public sector. Public servants seem to be as mobile as their private sector 
fellows, 10% changing jobs every year. As expected, the mobility is mostly between two 
establishments in the public sector and not between two different administrations and public 
firms while the reverse is true in the private sector.  
 
3.5 Work ethics and incentives 
 
The threat of laying-off workers or to bankrupt the firm provides high-powered incentives in 
the private sector (Reboul, 2007). Yet, special features of the public sector tend to show that 
incentives provided in the public sector are weak (Dixit, 2002). The managers of public 
activities and public servants often face multiple principals (the state, the unions, the public) 
and multiple tasks (for instance providing a public good and complementary services as a 
public service). There is no convincing empirical micro-evidence that evaluates the relative 
efficiency of public and private workers. The difficulties to assess any differential in 
productivities between males and females (Hellerstein, Neumann and Troske, 1999) show that 
evaluating the relative efficiency of labor between two sectors is a formidable task. We were 
told by the management of a public firm that the lowest productivity gains were achieved in 
activities where there were most public servants, which is another good example of a dynamic 
selection bias that plagues measurement of these issues. 
 
Management may often motivate agents in a non-monetary way. Working in the public sector 
would serve for some workers some idealistic or ethical purpose being at the service of the 
public. They may then sort themselves into different types of firms and may be motivated by 
the fact of working with likewise minds (see Besley and Ghatak, 2006, for an analysis of the 
behaviour of motivated workers). 
 
In summary, public firms appear to be larger than they would be in the private sector; the 
composition of the labor force is skewed towards groups like women who suffer larger 
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unemployment probabilities. Wages are higher as well for women and young people in the 
public sector and deferred wages such as pensions are larger for all public servants. If among 
other characteristics, job security is the most important difference between the public and the 
private sector seems to have mixed consequences on the welfare of the different group of 
workers. 
 
The question is now whether the public firm benefits from these differences and specifically, 
the ones that arise from the existence of full job security that they offer to their public 
servants.  
 
4. The employment of public servants: a competitive advantage for public firms? 
 
We have documented that employment in public firms is beneficial at least for some types of 
workers, those with lower skill levels, minorities and women in particular. Providing these 
higher benefits necessarily involves higher costs for the public firms. This is a factor that puts 
them at a disadvantage when competing with private firms.  
 
But this is only part of the picture. In order to evaluate whether or not public firms have an 
advantage compared to their private competitors, one must also look at the potential benefits 
for public firms when employing public servants. The more substantial these benefits; the 
more it would be likely that public employment can constitute a barrier to a level playing field 
in the product market. 
 
The first step of our argument is that private firms can in principle offer all the things to 
workers that public firms do. There is a massive literature on the so-called “internal labor 
markets”. This literature was pioneered by Doeringer and Piore (1971) who documented that 
firms are treating quite differently different types of workers. While some workers enjoy job 
security, high and stable wages, training and career opportunities, others may be on short-term 
employment contracts, have variable wages, and no training and career opportunities.  
 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994) and Lazear (1991) were the first to carry out quantitative 
case studies on internal labor markets; they showed that firms use predefined promotion paths 
and rarely fire white-collar workers and managers, similar to what public firms offer to their 
public servants. A number of theories have argued that through the mix of employment 
security, stable wages and promotion paths, firms can select and incentivize workers. 
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Particularly interesting are the theories of Gibbons and Waldman (1994) and Demougin and 
Siow (1994). The latter show that firms that use training intensive internal labor markets can 
coexist with firms that use more traditional labor market practices. Hence, it can well be 
beneficial for one firm to offer employment contracts that are quite similar to the ones that we 
observe in public firms, while others in the same market are not. Notice also that this 
literature talks mainly about the U.S. where there are taxes on layoffs (Margolis and Fougère, 
2001, for a review) and therefore incentives to keep the workers in the firm. Nevertheless, 
many large European firms (Nokia, Bertelsmann etc) do use internal labor market policies. 
 
Private firms can thus offer employment relations that are similar to the one that public 
servants enjoy. However, while the type of benefits, in particular, job security, and above-the-
market-rate compensation, intensive training etc exist in private firms as well, there are two 
important differences between public servants and private employees, and hence between an 
incumbent public firm and its private competitors: first, the status of public servant is 
guaranteed by law and hence does not rely on the willingness of firms to keep promises made; 
second, public firms do not contribute to the overall unemployment insurance system of an 
economy. 
 
4.1 Job security and safe wages of public servants 
 
Private firms can only promise job security and stable wages, but they cannot exclude to 
renege on it in extreme circumstances. Some examples are instructive. Most famously, 
Lincoln Electric, has never fired any of their workers as a means to adjust to unfavourable 
business conditions; companies like Daimler-Chrysler or Airbus, have more or less explicitly 
promised similar life-long employment to their workers, but their current business condition 
will force them to lay off workers. Bertrand (2004) has shown quantitatively that the U.S. 
firms that have been exposed most to import competition have moved away from using 
internal labor markets. Consequently, workers in more competitive sectors are now less 
shielded against changes in firm environments that increase pressure on wages. 
 
The status of public servants, however, is protected by law. They cannot be fired nor can their 
wages be cut, unless the law is changed. The commitment of public employers for public 
servants’ wages and benefits is hence fully deterministic unlike the promises of private firms 
that may be broken. This can clearly constitute an advantage for public firms. A public firm 
that competes with private firms could be able to hire workers at lower wage rates, because it 
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offers insurance -- stable wages and safe employment. This would be tantamount to reducing 
wage costs because of the security that only public firms can offer.  
 
There are however, three facts that shed doubt on this argument. The first one is that as we 
have documented above, public firms tend to pay higher wages, rather than lower wages (at 
least to some groups of workers). This is at odds with the argument that job security could be 
used as a way to reduce wages. Second, the people who benefit most from employment in the 
public sector, both in terms of wages and job safety, seem to be low-skilled men, women and 
minorities. If public firms were indeed to use employment of public servants to gain a 
competitive edge on the labor market, we would expect that it would be higher-skill groups 
and managers that should benefit most, because there is more competition for those groups. 
Indeed, private internal labor markets seem to be most beneficial for the higher echelons in 
the skill distribution (see Baker, Gibbs, Holmström, 1994, who have documented wages are 
convex in the rank within the firm). Workers that have most benefits in public employment 
however, are usually available at a lower market rate than the wage they receive within public 
firms. Third, our cases in Section 2 show that, public enterprises in liberalized markets tend to 
discontinue hiring public servants, and that new hires are employed according to the same 
rules and rationales as for private competitors. We tend to interpret this as “revealed 
preferences”: public firms do not seem to perceive hiring public servants as a competitive 
measure, otherwise they would not discontinue hiring public servants unless they are forced to 
(which to our knowledge is not the case).  
 
4.2 Unemployment insurance design and ways of financing it 
 
As public servants cannot be laid off, they cannot be hit by unemployment. As there is no risk 
of unemployment, one could argue that public firms do not have to contribute to the 
unemployment insurance of an economy. But this “no-risk/no-pay” argument may be only 
partially right. Recall the fundamental objectives of an unemployment insurance system: 
 
• Insurance (against temporary shocks in the firm, in the sector or in the economy) 
• Assistance (to those whose productivity is temporarily or permanently impaired) 
• Human capital reallocation and retraining (for those who owns outdated and degraded 
skills) 
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Insurance systems build on risk-sharing. Public firms do not share the risks of other firms in 
the economy. Public servants do not become unemployed, hence no private firm needs to 
cover their unemployment risk, but in turn, the public firm does not cover risks of the private 
firm either. The size of the insurance system hence shrinks when some firms do not 
contribute, which can lead to welfare losses. It is also the case that a self-insurance strategy is 
more costly and this is indeed what the public firms follow.  
 
To describe, in a simple way, the tradeoffs between the different instruments that the State can 
use for employment protection and unemployment insurance, we use the model proposed by 
Blanchard and Tirole (2006) and we extend it in the next section, to accommodate a public 
firm which proposes full job security and wage bargaining. This economic model is static but 
it has already rich implications for discussing policies. Specifically, it enables to study the 
role of unemployment benefits, layoff taxes and payroll taxes which are the main instruments 
discussed in the debate on the design of unemployment insurance. For instance, the structure 
of the layoff tax rates varies a lot across US states (see Margolis and Fougère, 2001 for a 
review) and layoff taxes do not exist in Europe (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003).  
 
A summary of the setting we use and the results we obtain in this model is in order before 
turning to the formal presentation of the model in the next subsection. We consider a public 
firm that operates in the same market as private firms. The public firm offers full job security 
to its workers. The government may decide to impose different payroll taxes on the public vs. 
private firms; public wages are determined by bargaining.  
 
Our main result is that it is indeed efficient to make public and private firms pay differing 
payroll taxes if all other things are equal (productivity, fixed costs of entry and wages). The 
model shows that the difference corresponds to the earnings of those workers who would be 
fired by private firms but are retained by private firms. More precisely these are the workers 
whose productivity is below the productivity level below which private firms would layoff 
workers. The difference between payroll taxes thus corresponds exactly to the no risk/no pay 
argument. 
 
What is interesting is that this conclusion is robust to changes in the underlying assumptions 
and design and levels of policy instruments. It holds if layoff taxes do not exist, as in 
European countries, and it holds if wages are different in the public and private sector. The 
difference between payroll taxes in the public and private firms is affected by distortions due 
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to the absence of instruments, such as layoff taxes or due to the structure of the economy 
(preferences, technology, ...) but these effects are shown to be of second order. The general 
principle still holds. 
 
Moreover, the case where the economy is composed by various sectors adds a new dimension. 
The net effect then depends on the design of the unemployment insurance. If there are no 
layoff taxes and unemployment benefits are paid through payroll taxes as in most European 
countries, the net effect depends on whether the public firm is in a sector where employment 
declines or is in expansion. In the latter case, most firms in such a sector do not lay off and the 
private sector firms are therefore net contributors to the system. In the case where 
employment in the sector is decreasing, private firms benefit from the unemployment 
insurance way of financing. Remark that public firms are neutral, it is their relative position 
vis à vis the private sector which is affected. 
 
There is no role for assistance and retraining in this static model. Hence, a brief discussion of 
these issues is necessary. First, both assistance and retraining have a public good aspect 
according as what society decides. Specifically, assistance would then be financed by payroll 
taxes and it does not differentially affect the private and public firms. Retraining in its public 
good dimension is not different from standard education. All firms benefit equally from 
education provided by the State and there is no reason to treat public and private firms 
differently with respect to financing the retraining of unemployed workers. Yet, note that if 
unemployment insurance allows workers to wait and find a better match on the labor market, 
the public firm could benefit from this. This is however a second order effect as 
unemployment exits are weakly affected by incentives (Atkinson, 1987). 
 
4.3 An economic model on unemployment and the interaction of public and private firms 
 
Assume first that there is a given total population of workers. A proportion p   is working as 
public servants in the public firm, occupying  p   positions. There is full job security in the 
public firm and these workers are never laid off. A mass  1 − p   of workers are not employed 
but will be recruited by the private firms in equilibrium. Parameter  p   is neither an 
endogenous variable nor a parameter controlled by the State. It indexes the weight of the 
public firm in this particular market. It is given ex-ante and likely results from the past level 
of public employment. 
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At the beginning of the period, private firms can enter by incurring a fixed cost  I  and employ 
one worker. The public firm pays the same recurring cost for each worker. Second, after their 
entry in the market, private firms offer a wage  w   to workers, and workers accept or refuse 
these offers. As a result of a simple arbitrage, all workers are recruited in equilibrium. In 
contrast, public workers and the public firm bargain, at the same time, over the public wage,  
wp  . Rents are equally shared between workers and the public firm whose transfers to the 
State are denoted  p  . These transfers include all profits of the public firm that accrue to the 
State as the owner of the public firm and they also include payroll taxes so that the transfers 
are net flows from the public firm to the State. 
 
After wages are determined, a productivity shock  y   in all firms and positions is realized. 
This may reflect realizations of demand, innovations etc. The shock varies between  0   and  1   
and is independently distributed across positions. It has distribution function  G   in the private 
sector. This distribution function is translated by a factor  Δ y   to obtain the distribution 
function in the public sector  Gp   i.e : 
Pry ≤ y0 ∣ Public  Gpy0  Gy0  Δy.  
Finally, after the realization of the shock, private sector workers are either laid off and are 
paid unemployment benefits     or workers remain employed and produce  y   at wage  w  . In 
case of layoff, firms pay a layoff rate  f.   Payroll taxes are equal to     for private firms. 
 
Firms are risk neutral and workers have utility  U..   The disutility of working is  b   in 
monetary terms. The welfare function of the State is utilitarian with some relative weight 
given to the workers of the public sector. It is equal to the sum of the utility of workers in the 
private sector multiplied by their mass  1 − p   and of the utility of workers in the public firm 
multiplied by their mass  p   and by a parameter     that might reflect the larger political 
weight of these workers (Gregory and Borland, 1999). 
 
We start with the case of “first best” where the government can use all the instruments 
,p , f, and where public and private workers have the same welfare weight (   1 ). We 
then turn to study various extensions. Specifically, we would analyze situations where welfare 
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weights for the public and private workers differ (  ≠ 1 ) and where the layoff tax  f   is not 
an instrument, in order to reflect the situation in most European countries where no layoff 
taxes exist. 
 
4.3.1 First-best solution when public and private workers are equally considered 
 
We start with the case where    1 . The Government’s optimization problem is to 
maximise the welfare function composed by three terms: the welfare of unemployed, the 
welfare of employed workers in the private sector and the welfare of public sector workers. 
max
,p ,f,,ȳ,w,wp
1 − pGȳUb    1 − GȳUw  p.Uwp  
It is subject to the free-entry condition for private firms: 
− Gȳf  
ȳ
1y − w − dGy  I,  
the government budget constraint: 
− 1 − pGȳ − f  1 − p1 − Gȳ.  p.p  0,  
the bargaining agreement in the public sector between management and workers: 

0
1y  ΔydGy − I  wp  p ,                                     (1) 
and the threshold productivity condition in the private sector: 
ȳ  w   − f.  
 
Solving this program as Blanchard and Tirole (2006) do, implies that: 
• The government fully insures workers against risk and status: 
w  b    wp  
• The production has efficient level: 
ȳ  b  
• Payroll taxes are larger in the private sector if expected productivities are equal (Δ y  0 ): 
p −   Δy  
0
ȳy − ȳdGy  Δy.    (2) 
The two first conditions are derived as in the first best of Blanchard and Tirole (2006). The 
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last condition comes from substracting the free-entry condition for private firms and the rent-
sharing agreement in the public sector. The inequality condition uses that the second term on 
the right-hand side is always negative. 
 
Our leading case is when there is no prior evidence of differences in the distribution function 
of productivities in the public and private sectors ( Δ y  0 ). Equation (2) establishes that 
taxes are lower in the public sector. Lower taxes partly compensate for the costs associated 
with the lowest part of the productivity distribution of positions that are producing in the 
public sector while they would not if they were made private. Indeed, the term in the integral 
is exactly the loss that the public firm incurs because it employs and pays workers under their 
value of leisure (ȳ  b) while private firms would lay off these workers. 
 
Some simple remarks to show that this result is robust to various changes in the assumptions: 
First the solution is not the first best in the public sector since some workers work with a 
productivity which is lower than their disutility of working,  b  . They hence destroy value and 
it would be optimal to temporarily layoff these workers and pay them full income discounted 
by the monetary equivalent of leisure,  b  , but we excluded this case by assumption. Second, 
remark that our conclusion extends to the case where the two distributions differ not only by a 
translation  Δ y   of productivities but by more general features. It indeed suffices to redefine  
Δ y   as the difference between the expected ex-ante productivities between the public and 
private sectors and the same conclusions hold true if Δy =0. Furthermore, it is also robust to 
introducing differences in the recurring costs  I   of establishing positions provided that we 
redefine  Δ y   so as to include these differences. Finally, the rule for rent sharing in the public 
sector can be different from equal sharing. The rent sharing equation (1) determines net 
transfers from the public firm to the State ( p  ) while the public wage is given by the 
arbitrage condition in the labor market ( wp  w  ). 
 
4.3.2 Extensions 
 
We can readily introduce a relative larger weight for the public workers    1  . The 
optimality condition now requires: 
U′w  U ′wp  
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so that: 
wp  w   − 1.Δw  
where  Δw  0 . Public wage  wp   is larger if    1  and this might rationalize why low-
skilled workers in the public sector are better paid than their fellow workers in the private 
sector. 
 
This change affects the difference between payroll taxes in the public and private sectors as 
given by equation (2) so that we now have:  
p −   Δy  
0
ȳy − ȳdGy −  − 1Δw.  
 
The conclusions of the previous section are modified accordingly but broadly apply. Payroll 
taxes and profits ( p  ) should be lower in the public sector because (1) public employment is 
completely protected (2) the public wage is higher than the private wage. The difference in 
payroll taxes implied by conclusion (1) does not depend on auxiliary assumptions about the 
mode of determination of public and private wages which is ultimately a political decision in 
this model if λ ≠ 1. 
 
Second, note that this condition on the difference between payroll taxes in the public and 
private sector does not depend on the existence of layoff taxes. If this instrument does not 
exist, it will distort the decisions of production in the private sector but it would not change 
the difference between payroll taxes in the public and private sector. This conclusion 
generally applies to any causes of distortion in the private sector as studied by Blanchard and 
Tirole (2006): limits on insurance due to a significant utility loss due to unemployment (social 
self-value, stigma etc) or limited liability for private firms; limits on layoff taxes; ex-post 
wage bargaining and ex-ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. The only difference with the 
first-best case comes through the influence of these distortions through the layoff threshold.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We have investigated the situation in which public and private firms compete in the same 
product market in which competition is fair, and the quality and efficiency of employment 
stocks in both firms are not different. The two firms only differ in the fact that public servants 
are employed by the public firm, so that this firm offers job security and does not pay any 
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payroll tax for unemployment risk. In this setting wages can actually be different for reasons 
that have nothing to do with the actual competition between firms in the product or labor 
markets. 
 
We have documented that employment in public firm is better for those workers who are less 
demanded by the labor market. This increases the cost of public firms. We have also 
presented some evidence that public firms who are competing with private firms try to reduce 
the share of their workforce who has public servant status. By a revealed preferences 
argument, public firms seem to gain not much of a competitive advantage from public 
servants. Otherwise, they would not discontinue hiring of public servants unless forced to.  
 
Secondly we show in a simple model that non-payment of unemployment payroll tax is 
justified by the fact that the public firm self-insures their workers against unemployment. As 
self-insurance is generally more costly than general insurance, this cannot be taken as giving a 
competitive advantage to the public firm. Overall, there hence does not seem compelling 
reasons that competition is distorted if public firms maintain public servant employment for a 
transitory period. 
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